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EDITORIAL
It is to be hoped that we shall not be
suspected of introducing a highly con
troversial question of national impor
tance into the columns of a technical journal if we discuss a recent
decision of the supreme court of the United States in the case of
the Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Company; nor, we trust, shall
we be charged with a refusal to accept the decisions of the court
or with a lack of respect for its members if, in the course of discus
sion, we question the validity of the arguments by which the
decision is supported in the opinion handed down. The case is
interesting to accountants in more ways than one. The point at
issue—whether under the tax law an allowance should be made
for obsolescence of goodwill—is itself an interesting technical
question. The decisions in the courts below turned largely on the
legislative history of tax provisions, which accountants played an
important part in formulating, and the whole history of the case
indicates the strange turns of fortune to which taxpayers may be
subject. We propose, therefore, to consider it in some detail.
Obsolescence of
Goodwill

Let us deal first with the proceedings in
the supreme court. As has been said,
the question at issue was whether or not
under the revenue act of 1918 an allowance could be made for the
obsolescence of goodwill. No question of fact was in dispute. In
the language of the opinion, “The goodwill was that of a brewery
and is found to have been destroyed by prohibition legislation.
The deduction claimed is for the fiscal year ending May 31, 1919,
it having been apparent early in 1918 that prohibition was im161
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minent, and the officers having taken steps to prepare for the total
or partial liquidation of the company. The amount of the deduc
tion to be made is agreed upon if any deduction is to be allowed.”
The sole contention of the government, which brought the appeal,
was that in the provisions of the revenue act of 1918 relating to
exhaustion, wear and tear and obsolescence, “the statute only
intended to embrace property of such a nature that it was de
creased, consumed or disposed of by use in the trade or business,
.and goodwill is not such property.”
As between the parties, nothing turned
on the nature of the event which de
stroyed the goodwill. The govern
ment’s position would have been precisely the same had the case
been one of a business brought to an end by an unexpected ex
haustion of the world’s supply of its raw material. The court,
however, decided against the taxpayer, on the ground that neither
of the words “exhaustion” and “obsolescence” was apt to de
scribe termination by law as an evil of a business otherwise flour
ishing; and that to make such an allowance would be to grant
part compensation to the taxpayer for the extinguishment of his
business by law, in the form of “an abatement of taxes otherwise
due,” and that it was incredible that congress should have in
tended such a result. But it is difficult to perceive how any
question arises of abatement of taxes otherwise due. The profits
for the last years of the company’s operation had to be determined
and taxed. The fact, conceded on the record, that the useful life
of the capital assets of the business was to be cut short, was
claimed to be under general provisions a factor which would re
duce the taxable income and the tax. The revenue act did not
exclude breweries from the benefit of these provisions. The tax
payer had been guilty of nothing illegal. Upon what theory,
then, can the taxpayer be denied the benefit of the provisions and
its tax increased by such denial? If the general provisions would
not give the relief sought, if the premature termination of the use
ful life of an asset employed in a business which is brought to an
unexpected end is not covered by the terms used in the act, the
taxpayer has no right to succeed. But if they would afford that
relief, there is nothing in the revenue act, nor surely in considera
tions of public policy, to deprive the taxpayer of the benefit on
account of the nature of the event which brought the business to a
162
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premature end. Congress, acting within its powers, saw fit to
enact prohibition without compensation; but there is nothing to
suggest that it intended to impose an added burden on the in
dustries affected by requiring that their taxable income, during
the short period of legal operation left them, should, by an excep
tion to a general rule, be determined as if that period had been
unlimited. The opinion, we think, does an injustice to congress
when it imputes to congress such an intention.

Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Jus
tice Stone concurred in the result, but
wrote no opinion. Their decision prob
ably turned on the question of the applicability of the clause
relied upon to goodwill in general, rather than on the interpreta
tion of the attitude of congress toward a business which had
become noxious to the constitution, which led to the rather sum
mary dismissal of the taxpayers’ contentions by Mr. Justice
Holmes. The only words in his opinion which seem to bear di
rectly on this question are contained in the sentence: “Neither
word is apt to describe termination by law as an evil of a business
otherwise flourishing, and neither becomes more applicable be
cause the death is lingering rather than instantaneous.” It may
be that if the effect of the decision as an authority comes to be
considered in a future case, the declaration that neither word
[exhaustion or obsolescence] is apt to describe the termination
of a business otherwise flourishing will be held to have been the
basis of the decision, and the references to the prohibition law to
have been merely obiter dicta. Accurately speaking, the question
is perhaps whether either “exhaustion” or “obsolescence” is or
is not an apt term to describe the effect on capital assets of an
event which is about to bring a prosperous business in which they
are employed to an unexpected end, rather than whether the
words are apt to describe the event itself or not. In considering
such a question, an examination of the history of the legislation
and of the practice of the treasury would seem, under the deci
sions of the court, to be pertinent if not essential.
Applicability to Case
of Breweries

In the bureau of internal revenue and in
the court below, the question had turned
on the interpretation of the provision of
section 234 (a) of the revenue act of 1918, allowing as a deduction
163
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from gross income, inter alia, “a reasonable allowance for the ex
haustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or business,
including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence.” Acting
under this authority, the treasury in 1919 issued a regulation pro
viding for an allowance for obsolescence of goodwill of breweries as
a result of prohibition. This ruling remained in effect from 1919
until 1927. In 1927, a case having come into the courts on the
question whether or not the goodwill had, in fact, been destroyed
in that case, a district court held that the provision relied on did
not authorize a deduction in any case for obsolescence of goodwill.
This decision being affirmed by the circuit court of appeals, the
commissioner amended the regulations so as to deny the deduc
tion. It is to be presumed that the great majority of the cases
had been decided under the regulations in force from 1919 to
1927, so that only a small residue of taxpayers was affected by the
change of position. The circuit court of appeals, in deciding the
case referred to (the Red Wing Malting Company case), held that
the language, “including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence,”
did not add a new kind of deduction, and that the allowance for
“exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or busi
ness” covered no more than the provision of the 1916 act, which
allowed a deduction for the “exhaustion, wear and tear of prop
erty arising out of its use or employment in the business or trade,”
and that therefore exhaustion was not allowable unless caused by
use. This conclusion was based largely on the court’s reading of
the legislative history of the provision, a history which is of par
ticular interest to accountants.

The corporation excise tax law of 1909
How Depreciation was
allowed the deduction of “a reasonable
Interpreted in 1909
allowance for depreciation of property,
if any.” This act is memorable because it led to the first oc
casion on which the accountants of the country as a body pre
sented the views of the profession on what they conceived to be
unsound legislation and also the first occasion on which members
of the profession were called in to assist in framing regulations to
give effect to an apparently unworkable act. Since the tax was
in terms based on receipts and payments, any allowance for de
preciation might seem incongruous if it were not well understood
that the law was conceived and was to be administered as an
income or profits tax, and that the words “received” and “paid”
164
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were used as what has since come to be known as camouflage,
which was expected to protect the law from attack on constitu
tional grounds. In the regulations, the term “depreciation” was
interpreted in the accounting rather than the etymological sense,
and it was provided that the deduction should be “the loss which
arises from exhaustion, wear and tear or obsolescence out of the
use to which the property is put.” There was, however, a dis
position in the treasury to make the determination of the allow
ance at least in part a question of value rather than of exhaustion.
When the revenue act of 1913 was
being prepared, a committee of the
American Association of Public Ac
countants, predecessor of the American Institute of Accountants,
conferred with those who were drafting the bill and recommended,
among other things, that the sense of the regulation under the
1909 act should be embodied in the text of the act of 1913.
That act, when passed, provided for “a reasonable allowance
for depreciation by use, wear and tear of property, if any.”
It was, however, apparent that depreciation of property used,
which ought to be allowed, might arise while the property was in
use, but not by or from use. Such allowances were commonly
made by the treasury under the act of 1913 and also under the
act of 1916. In 1918, income taxation had assumed a new im
portance, and, the 1917 law having proved almost unworkable,
the treasury, for the first time, was allowed to draft a law. The
bill, as it passed the house, provided for “a reasonable allowance
for exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or
business.” The senate amended the provision to read, “a reason
able allowance for depreciation of property used in the trade or
business.” The conference committee changed the provision
to read as it now stands, “a reasonable allowance for exhaustion,
wear and tear of property used in the trade or business, including
a reasonable allowance for obsolescence.” The reasonable
interpretation of the intent of congress would seem to be that in
1918 it sanctioned the previous practice of allowing deductions for
exhaustion of property used, even though that exhaustion
resulted not from use but from other causes such as lapse of time,
and that it specifically provided for consideration of the element
of obsolescence in determining the allowance. It was upon this
construction that the treasury regulation, above referred to,
165
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specifically allowing obsolescence of goodwill in the case of brew
eries, was formulated. The circuit court of appeals in the
eighth circuit appears from the record to have based its decision
adverse to this regulation in the Red Wing Malting Company
case on a reading of this history which was not entirely accurate.
The circuit court of the second circuit, in a careful opinion in the
Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Company case, sustained the
regulation. It was on this narrow point of statutory construction
that the latter case went to the supreme court, there to be
decided, as we have said, on a point which apparently had not
been considered by anyone in the ten years’ history of the
question.
This history strikingly illustrates the
hazards involved in taking a tax case
to court. The Red Wing Malting
Company, presumably convinced of the soundness of its position
on the question of fact which was at issue in the treasury (i.e.,
whether its goodwill had been destroyed or not), went to the
courts only to have its contention on the question of fact sustained
but the allowance denied as a matter of law on the basis of a
new meaning read into the statute in the light of the previous
legislative history of the question. The Haberle Crystal Springs
Brewing Company, having succeeded in convincing one circuit
court of appeals that the other circuit court had erred in its
reading of legislative history and its legislative construction,
was taken to the supreme court on this narrow question, only to
have its case decided on a point which had never been urged or
argued.
The Hazard
of Court

Every second year in the history of
legislation is a time of comparative
calm for American accountants and
with equal regularity the intervening years are filled with fear
and uncertainty. No year is altogether free of the trammels of
doubt, for there is always a legislature or two which is about
to meet or is meeting, and whenever that happens the accountant
is in danger of something new and strange. This year of grace
1930 is an off year. There are only ten states or territories whose
legislative bodies are required to assemble. Others, it is always
true, may be called in special session, but that is not probable.
166
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The public is not indulgent in its judgment of the need for special
sessions, and legislators themselves are not so apt to be led
astray into unnecessary convention as they once were. It may
be assumed, therefore, that the only legislatures which imperil
accountancy and other things this year will be those of Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island, South Carolina and Virginia, which met in January, that
of Porto Rico, which met in February and that of Louisiana,
which is to meet in May. Ten legislatures, it is quite true, can
do a great deal of harm, but in comparison with the potential
accomplishments of forty or more legislatures meeting in the odd
years, the menace of the even year seems almost negligible.
And then, of course, it should not be forgotten that any legislature
may enact laws or amend existing laws to the general benefit of
mankind or perhaps to the particular assistance of the accountant.
It is not fair to disregard the occasional good work done by
legislatures. Often the members of these institutions are imbued
with a genuine desire to right a wrong or to relieve intolerable
conditions, and in a good many cases they succeed. The unfor
tunate truth that most legislation is either unnecessary or vicious
is not or should not be the only factor in the public’s estimation.
Until we come to a completely benevolent autocracy or a pure
anarchy, we seem destined to suffer legislative interference.
It is not ideal at all, but it is practical, at any rate in our present
undeveloped condition.

The dangers which lurk in legislative
Accountants Themselves
halls are not pointed solely at account
Often to Blame
ants. There are many other people
engaged in equally respectable pursuits whose activities are sub
ject to constant meddling. If accountancy seems sometimes to
be singled out for special attack it must be remembered that
accountants themselves are largely to blame. Wherever there is
a law which grants peculiar rights and titles to a select class or
group there will always be clamorous members of the community
crying out that their liberties are in jeopardy or that they too
should be stamped with the seal of state sanction. Those fellows
from the outside crowding into the corridors of capitols are
accountants of sorts. Some of them are good accountants,
some are miserable accountants, others are merely accountants
in posse; but to the public they look like accountants and the
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legislator who is not adept in the separation of good and evil
among the claimants to proficiency may be forgiven if now and
then he pays too much heed to the protests of the protestant.
It is most improbable that any legislator, except when personal
friends or supporters are concerned, feels much interest in the
form or administration of laws governing professional practice of
accountancy. He has other more magnetic matters drawing his
attention. But when a vociferous demand for new law or amend
ment is made he listens to it, and in the absence of special knowl
edge he may be misled. A great deal of legislation has been
needed to bring accountancy to its present place in the esteem
of the public and as conditions change there will be necessity for
other enactments. No one can deny that. The sad thing is that
many of the efforts to amend are dictated by nothing more
disinterested than a party of outs trying to be ins.
There will be attempts this year to
maim or kill existing statutes and some
of them may be sufficiently serious to
merit attention, but so far as we have heard nothing of a grave
significance has been introduced in any of the legislatures which
are in session, and as most of the ten legislatures are nearing the
conclusion of what they love to describe as their labors, it seems
justifiable to hope that nothing injurious will be done. In some
states there are laws which could be improved by amendment.
There are crude or undesirable provisions in many laws, and as
time goes on it will be expedient to change them, but when the
effort is made it should be only after careful deliberation by
accountants themselves in their societies. Individual attempts
to alter laws are generally ill advised and productive of failure or
worse. Much of the existing fault in laws is due to an unseemly
haste to have something on the statute books. If the accountants
in each state had worked harmoniously together, if all opinions
had been discussed, if the interests of everyone had been con
sidered and so far as possible protected, and if then there had
been a united effort to present the case to legislators, we should
have today a great deal better laws than we have and there would
not be half the bitterness and opposition which is so frequently
encountered. No law can be equally acceptable to all men and
there will be opponents always. But the new tendency manifest
in some parts of the country to give thought to the opinions of all
168
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concerned will do much to remove honest enmity. It is useless
to deplore the lack of unity in many past instances. The great
point now is to take care that the reforms which are yet to be
made be made after thorough preparation. If that be done the
biennial peril of the odd years and the modified peril of the even
will shrink and become controllable, to the infinite joy of us all.
In recent issues of The Journal of
Confirmation of Secu
A
ccountancy we referred, at times in a
rities in Transfer
spirit of irony, to the difficulty which
has arisen, especially in the audit of brokerage houses, in obtain
ing confirmation of securities held by transfer agents. The com
ments evoked a good deal of correspondence, and both transfer
agents and accountants have been seeking a settlement of the
difficulty. It appears, according to the transfer agents, that the
enormous volume of securities submitted for transfer renders the
task of verifying extremely heavy and these transfer agents feel
that it is fair to make a charge for the service. Accountants felt
that something must be done in order at least to ensure attention
to requests for confirmation. The Bulletin of the American In
stitute of Accountants reports that a meeting was held on January
21st at which there were representatives of the principal transfer
agents and of the accounting profession, when a tentative agree
ment was reached that for a period of six months a charge of $1
for each item confirmed should be made. Whether this charge
will prove excessive or not remains to be seen, but in any case the
accountant can avoid any appearance of extortion by specifying
to his client the amount of the demand by the bank or other trans
fer agent for confirmation. This agreement has been approved by
a considerable number of companies which have transfer depart
ments. A few companies will not make any charge for the serv
ice, but the great majority will charge a fee of $1. A special
form of request for confirmation has been prepared and is printed
in the Institute Bulletin issued February 15, 1930.
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